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INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STRATEGIES 
IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 
 
 
Abstract 
The concept of ‘distance’ has been used by international business scholars to explain 
variations in international business strategies and operations across countries. The more 
distant a host country is from the organizational centre of a multinational enterprise (MNE), 
the more it has to manage cultural, regulatory and cognitive differences, and to develop 
appropriate entry strategies, organizational forms, and internal procedures to accommodate 
these differences. 
 Scholarly research has focused on the concept of psychic distance, which has been 
narrowed down in empirical work to indices based on Hofstede’s work on culture. However, 
these measures capture only very partially the dimensions of distance of concern to 
international business. In this paper, we show how the broader theoretical concept of 
institutional distance, which incorporates normative, regulatory and cognitive aspects, affects 
entry strategies. Specifically, our theoretical arguments suggest that the impact of distance 
varies with different aspects of the concept of institutional distance, and that this impact 
interacts with both the investor’s experience and with the relative importance of the pertinent 
operation for the investing MNE. Using a unique dataset of foreign direct investment in 
emerging economies that incorporates multi-host as well as multi-home countries, we find 
empirical support for our propositions, and provide an explanation for apparently inconsistent 
results in the previous literature.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of ‘distance’ has been of central interest to international business scholars’ 
attempts to explain variations in international business strategies and operations across 
countries. The more distant a host country is from the organizational centre of a multinational 
enterprise (MNE), the more it has to bridge differences in culture, in laws and regulation, and 
in organizational practices and routines. The MNE has to adapt its entry strategies, 
organizational forms, and internal procedures to manage these differences (Johansen and 
Vahlne, 1977; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Kostova and Roth, 2002).  
Institutional distance is of particular concern for Western MNEs operating in 
emerging economies, where idiosyncratic regulatory environments may inhibit international 
business (Henisz, 2003). For instance, legal codes governing market transactions may be less 
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extensive, and law enforcement may be less efficient, for instance with respect to intellectual 
property rights (IPR). The challenges of adaptation may be less serious for MNE from 
developing countries, e.g. Asia. Organizations must develop managerial and commercial 
practices and routines for filtering and processing information that suit the variations in 
institutions. Institutional differences between source and host countries affect investors’ 
internal transfer of knowledge and practices, and their external quest for legitimacy in the 
local context, and therefore have to be accommodated when designing business strategies (Xu 
and Shankar, 2003; Luo, 2001; Meyer, 2001). The more the host economy differs from the 
context with which the MNE is familiar, the more difficult the adaptation. However, with a 
few notable exceptions (Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Xu, Pan and Beamish, 2004), researchers 
have not yet come to grips with these problems. 
The international business literature has developed the concept of “psychic distance” 
to address some of these issues (Johansen and Vahlne, 1977); and this is usually narrowed 
down in empirical studies by employing an index first developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) 
on the basis of Hofstede’s (1980) work on national culture. For Hofstede, culture mainly 
encompasses the norms and beliefs held by individuals in a country. Several studies use the 
Kogut-Singh index to show that the distance between FDI’s host and home countries 
influences strategies pursued by MNE, for example entry mode choice (Kogut and Singh, 
1988; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Agarwal, 1994). However, psychic distance is a broad 
concept, and aspects other than cultural norms influence business strategies (Ghemawat, 
2001; Shenkar, 2001). When entering a foreign market, MNEs interact with a complex local 
context that also includes regulatory and cognitive institutions (Scott, 1995/2001). MNEs 
have to adjust to the multifaceted institutional environment of each country where they 
operate (Meyer, 2001; Henisz, 2003; Peng, 2003), and this adjustment is more challenging, 
the more the foreign environment differs from the MNE’s home territory.  
In this paper, we build on recent theoretical work by Scott (1995/2001) and Kostova 
(1998) to extend the concept of distance by incorporating normative, regulatory and cognitive 
elements (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Xu and Shankar, 2003). Theoretical considerations 
suggest that strategic decisions in international business may be affected in very different 
ways by the different dimension of distance. We investigate these effects for a key decision in 
international business, investors’ likelihood of entering by greenfield investment; and we 
investigate the moderating effects of investor and project characteristics on the distance to 
mode relationship. We therefore add to the literature on entry mode choice (e.g. Agarwal, 
1994; Park and Ungson, 1997; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001) by studying a broader concept 
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of distance, and their interactions with other variables. 
We propose that three indices should be used jointly to capture the relevant aspects of 
distance to international business; the Kogut-Singh index to capture the normative dimension 
being complemented with indices of regulatory and cognitive distance based on widely 
available country-level data. These measures are designed to be employable for a large range 
of research issues in international business. We empirically test our propositions with these 
measures, employing a multi-host multi-home country dataset suitable for testing the effects 
of distance. We thus improve over prior studies that typically employ single-host multi-home, 
or multi-home single-host country datasets. We generate the dataset with a questionnaire 
survey of foreign investors in India, Vietnam, Egypt and South Africa, four countries at 
different stages of economic development and with substantial differences in their normative, 
regulatory and cognitive environments. The investors in the sample originate from 48 home 
countries, including both industrialized economies and emerging economies. The special 
appeal of this dataset is the high variation of institutional contexts between both source and 
recipient countries, so the results are unlikely to be driven by the idiosyncrasies of a particular 
source or host country. 
In support of our theoretical arguments, we find clear variations in the way that 
different aspects of distance impact on strategic decisions. Thus, while regulatory distance 
increases the propensity for greenfield investment, cognitive distance has diametrically the 
opposite effect. Though normative distance is found not to have a significant direct effect, it 
interacts with both the investor’s international experience and with the relative importance of 
the pertinent operation for the investing MNE. Our findings may help to explain ambiguities 
in previous results that rely on a single proxy for psychic distance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss our 
theoretical constructs: institutional distance, and the entry modes. Then, we develop 
hypotheses concerning the impact of institutional distance on MNE’s choice of entry mode, 
before developing our new measures of institutional distance between countries. We next 
introduce the methods of empirical analysis, before presenting and interpreting the empirical 
results. Conclusions for international business are drawn in the final section.  
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
Institutional Distance in International Business  
Institutional theory has emerged as a leading theoretical foundation for research on 
 5
enterprise strategies in emerging economies, along with transaction-cost and resource based 
views (Hoskisson et al., 2000). An important characteristic of emerging economies is that 
market-supporting institutions are less developed, and thus constrain firms’ strategic choices 
(Khanna and Palepu 2000; Peng, 2003, Ramamurti, 2004). Institutional theory provides a 
framework to analyze the determinants of business strategies in such economies (Peng 2003, 
Wright et al., 2005).  
Scott’s (1995/2001) three ‘pillars of the institutional framework’ provide a broad basis 
to differentiate aspects of countries’ institutional profile (Kostova, 1998; Busenitz, 2000) and 
of institutional distance (Kostova and Roth, 2002). The regulatory pillar of the institutional 
framework lays out the ground rules for doing business, reflecting the laws and regulations of 
a region or country and the extent to which these rules are effectively monitored and 
enforced. The cognitive pillar rests on the cognitive structures embedded in a society; that is, 
the widely shared social knowledge and cognitive categories (e.g. schemata and stereotypes) 
(Markus and Zajonc, 1985). The normative pillar consists of beliefs, values, and norms that 
define expected behavior in a society. These pillars of the institutional framework are based 
on different types of motivation, respectively coercive, mimetic, and normative, and differ in 
their degree of formalization and tacitness (Scott, 1995/2001). In consequence, they exert 
dissimilar pressures and expectations on organizations (Pfeffer, 1982; Oliver, 1991; 
D’Aunno, Sutton, and Price, 1991).  
In international business, the regulatory, cognitive, and normative dimensions all 
influence strategies and operations of affiliates in foreign countries. They moderate the 
acceptance of MNE’s norms and practices within the socially constructed system of rules, 
norms, and cognitive frames in different host environments (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999); and 
they facilitate or impede the transfer of strategic organizational practices from a parent 
company to an affiliate (Kostova and Roth, 2002). The “liability of foreignness” (Zaheer 
1995) lowers the profitability of foreign investors compared to their local competitors. To 
compensate for this, MNEs must transfer their organizational practices that constitute an 
important source of competitive advantage to their affiliates (Kogut, 1991; Grant, 1996). 
Local firms are adapted to local institutions, and their organizational structures and cultures 
have to be consistent with the isomorphic pressures in their local environment. Foreign 
affiliates have to accommodate these same pressures and earn legitimacy in order to ensure 
their survival and success in the new context (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The need to gain legitimacy with both the local 
environment and with the worldwide organization of the MNE exposes subsidiaries of 
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multinational firms to ‘institutional dualism’ (Kostova and Roth 2002). MNE’s ease of 
adjustment depends on their familiarity with a country’s institutional profile (Xu and 
Shenkar, 2002; Xu, Pan and Beamish, 2004). 
*** Figure 1 approximately here *** 
The obstacles faced by MNEs operating abroad are at least of two types (Figure 1). 
Firstly, the interaction of the foreign parent and the local affiliate is inhibited by their 
embeddedness in different national contexts. Institutional distance may thus inhibit internal 
coordination and integration, notably the transfer of knowledge and practices. Secondly, the 
MNE affiliate is subject to institutional pressures from both its parent and from the local 
environment (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Its ways of doing business may thus differ from that 
of local organizations, which may inhibit the interaction between the foreign affiliate and 
local organizations and individuals. Thus, MNE affiliates may be constrained in developing 
the external relations that could allow them to gain legitimacy in the local environment.  
The more different the MNEs origins are from the context that they enter, the greater 
will become obstacles to attaining local legitimacy and to practice transfer. International 
business research has analyzed the adaptation of business to foreign institutions with 
reference to “psychic distance”. This concept captures “the sum of factors preventing the flow 
of information from and to the market” and, among other aspects, encompasses “differences 
in language, education, business practices, culture and industrial development” (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977, p. 24). Following Kogut and Singh (1988), previous work has primarily been 
based on Hofstede’s (1980) work on national culture, which measures culture on four scales: 
masculinity-femininity, individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power-
distance. As argued above, organizations act in an even more complex environment formed 
by regulatory, cognitive and normative pillars of the institutional framework (Scott 
1995/2001). The three dimensions – regulatory, normative and cognitive – may have varying 
effects on investor strategies, and interact in different way with the specific characteristics of 
the MNE concerned.1 We thus use this broader concept of institutional distance to investigate 
the relationship between distance and business strategies. 
                                                 
1 The obstacles to business vary across different elements of the institutional framework. Kostova and Roth 
(2002) show that internalization of organizational practices by MNE affiliates is facilitated by favorable 
cognitive and normative institutions factors. Yet, in a favorable regulatory environment, a parent’s request to 
adopt a specific practice may be perceived as an external coercion and impede its internalization. With respect to 
affiliates’ quest to establish and maintain legitimacy, the normative and cognitive dimensions of institutions 
pose a greater challenge because regulatory institutions are more formalized and thus easier understood by 
newcomers (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). 
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Institutional distance is a useful tool in analyzing all international business 
relationships, but is of particular relevance with respect to emerging economies because of 
the diversity of inward investors. Emerging economies, typically receive most FDI from 
developed countries, and in Table 1 we illustrate this for our sample of emerging and 
developed markets. Indeed, emerging and mature economies receive most of their FDI inflow 
from the same developed countries (see also UNIDO 2003). This implies that emerging 
markets typically experience a large variation in the distance between their own environments 
and those of their main foreign investors, which we confirm for our sample of countries 
below. 
*** Table 1 approximately here *** 
 
Entry Mode Choice 
The choice of entry mode represents one of the most important strategic decisions by MNEs 
operating in emerging economies, and has been analyzed extensively in the international 
business literature using in particular transactions cost or resource based theories.  For 
instance, the level of ownership (e.g. Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hill, Hwang and Kim, 
1990, Meyer 2001) and the choice between greenfield investment and cooperative modes 
(Hennart and Park, 1993; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; 
Anand and Delios, 2002) have been investigated.  Transactions cost research focuses on the 
costs of alternative organizational arrangements, and suggest that firms prefer modes of 
operation that internalize sensitive interfaces (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hennart and 
Park, 1993). The resource based view focuses on how alternative modes facilitate or inhibit 
the processes of organizational learning (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998) and of developing 
and exploiting resources (Anand and Delios, 2002). Both have been complemented with 
institutional variables (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Meyer, 2001, Meyer and Nguyen, 
2005), but not as yet with a theoretically grounded set of variables capturing the complexity 
of institutional distance.  
 In emerging economies, the main decision faced by foreign investors is probably 
between a greenfield investment on one side, and partnering with local firms by acquisitions 
and joint venture (JV) on the other. This is because MNE’s entering a developing market 
must first choose between accessing local context-specific resources and capabilities in 
embedded form, or entering alone. Due to high distances in institutions, entrants often need 
local resources such as institutional or market knowledge that is embedded in existing 
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organizations (Meyer and Estrin, 2001; Anand and Delios 2002) and these can be accessed 
either by forming a joint venture or by taking over a local firm.  
 
Institutional distance and the entry mode choice 
Alternative modes of entry provide foreign investors with different means to manage the dual 
challenges of institutional distance; gaining legitimacy and transferring practices. Greenfield 
investors establish a new organization by recruiting and training staff individually, and 
creating an organizational structure that matches the MNE’s global structures (Brooke and 
Remmers, 1970; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Investors can therefore create an organizational 
culture that is similar to the parent, which reduces the frictions between parent and 
subsidiaries, and facilitates the transfer of practices. Consequently MNEs are more likely to 
choose a greenfield investment in situations where transmitting their own practices to their 
affiliates is of greater concern than earning and maintaining legitimacy. 
 However, greenfield projects have, at least initially, only very limited legitimacy in 
the local environment, while cooperation with a local partner in form of a JV or an acquisition 
enables the foreign investor to benefit from the partner’s local status. Cooperative entry thus 
allows the MNE to appear less foreign than entry via greenfield projects (Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999), even though the process of internal accommodation may not always be 
smooth (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Therefore the choice of a JV or a local acquisition is more 
appropriate in MNE’s for which the attainment of local legitimacy is of greater concern than 
transferring practices to affiliates. However, such cooperation implies that the local 
organization is more strongly influenced by local practices, which implies that the 
interactions with other units of the foreign parent MNE may be less smooth. Thus greenfield 
projects facilitate transfer of organizational practices, while JVs and acquisitions are more 
useful to build local legitimacy.  
This differential exposure to local institutions makes it natural to apply institutional 
theory to analyze the link between differences in business environments and MNEs’ entry 
modes (Davis, Desai and Francis, 2000; Lu 2002, Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Harzing, 2003). We 
thus extend the prior entry mode literature by using various aspects of institutional distance to 
separate the effects of regulatory, normative and cognitive distance. In the next section, we 
develop specific hypotheses about how different aspects of institutional distance might 
influence entry mode choice. In addition to direct effects, we consider the possible interaction 
with the investors’ experience and the relative exposure to the local context. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES  
Direct Effects of Distance on Entry Mode 
Different tensions between local and corporate institutional pressures are created in the three 
institutional pillars by distance. Kostova (1999) argues that high normative, regulatory and 
cognitive institutional distance between the host and home country impedes the transfer of 
strategic organizational practices from a parent company to a recipient. If a practice is 
inconsistent with existing local regulations, norms or cognitive structures, then employees 
may be reluctant to implement it, or might face problems in understanding and learning it. 
Thus, bonus-based payment schemes are an example of a practice that may be difficult to 
transfer (Pennings, 1993). Regulatory barriers may prohibit certain elements of the scheme in 
some countries, normative barriers may moderate the appreciation of standing out among a 
peer group, and cognitive differences may influence the perceived causality between 
individual effort and remuneration.   
Normative and cognitive distance between an acquired business unit and the parent 
organization especially inhibits its ability to attain legitimacy in the local context (Kostova 
and Zaheer, 1999). In contrast, regulatory aspects are more formalized and thus are easier 
understood by MNEs, and more accepted as a cause for local adaptation. Therefore, a high 
normative and cognitive distance impedes the adoption of an MNE’s practice and restrains 
the affiliate’s capacity to establish legitimacy, while a high regulatory distance is likely to 
have a negative effect primarily on the adoption of an MNE’s practices.  
By establishing a greenfield investment, an MNE can partially alleviate these 
difficulties in adopting desired practices caused by regulatory distance because it can create a 
new organization after its own image, e.g. by recruiting suitable individuals and by training 
them in the parent firm’s organizational practices. Moreover, as we have seen, regulatory 
distance does not create equally important obstacles to gaining local legitimacy. As regulatory 
rules are mostly codified, foreigners may find it relatively easy to adapt to local regulatory 
pressures without a local partner, even if regulatory distance is high. Thus, we hypothesize 
that overcoming obstacles to practice adoption outweighs the need to obtain local legitimacy 
as regulatory distance increases. Hence, the balance of advantage suggests that an increase in 
regulatory distance will have a positive impact on MNEs’ propensity to establish a greenfield 
project:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: MNEs are more likely to choose greenfield investment than acquisition or 
joint venture when the regulatory distance between the home and the host countries is large. 
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 On the other hand, both normative and cognitive distance have a negative impact on 
the adoption of practices and the affiliates’ ability to earn legitimacy. However, the impact on 
entry mode choice is complex. Obstacles to practice adaptation in existing local organizations 
would encourage greenfield investment in the same way as for regulatory distance.  However, 
obstacles to gaining legitimacy would encourage entry by joint venture or acquisition. 
Adaptation to local institutional pressures is more challenging if facing normative and 
cognitive differences than with regulatory differences. While regulatory institutions are 
relatively transparent, norms and cognition require intensive cross-cultural communication 
because they are hard to comprehend, and knowledge about other cultures is often tacit 
(Boyacigiller, Goodman and Phillips, 2004). Such communication is easier if an MNE 
affiliate obtains the knowledge of a local organization through a joint venture or an acquired 
firm. Greenfield investors have less cultural knowledge to draw on when communicating with 
local peers, which inhibits efforts to gain legitimacy. The impact of normative and cognitive 
on entry mode choice therefore depends on the relative importance of practice mode adoption 
and attaining local legitimacy.   
We would argue that MNE’s can more easily adopt behaviors and practices within 
businesses where they have some understanding of the underlying technologies and markets 
than they can with respect to, for example, supply chains, purchases of inputs, ability to 
market outputs and dealing with local rules and regulations which entail attaining local 
legitimacy.  Thus, when normative and cognitive distance is high, interaction with the local 
environment will be particularly important, which increases the importance of creating links 
with local peers.  This leads us to hypothesize that, in these circumstances, the need to gain 
local legitimacy and to access local business networks will outweigh other considerations.  
Hence normative and cognitive distance will encourage JV entry or acquisitions rather than 
greenfield entry.2   
 
Hypothesis 1b: MNEs are less likely to choose greenfield investment than acquisition or joint 
venture when the normative distance between the home and the host countries is large. 
 
                                                 
2 This is supported for instance by Meyer and Lieb-Dóczy (2003) who show that, when acquired subsidiaries in 
Hungary and East Germany have some degree of managerial autonomy, they can generate innovative solutions 
adapted to the local context and new capabilities that can be used in the MNE’s worldwide operations. This 
suggests that, at least for these acquisitions, accommodating the legitimacy pressure has been more important 
than adopting corporate practices. 
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Hypothesis 1c: MNEs are less likely to choose greenfield investment than acquisition or joint 
venture when the cognitive distance between the home and the host countries is large. 
 
Institutional distance and the size of the local operation  
The relative strength of isomorphic pressures on an affiliate from the local environment and 
from foreign parent depends on specific internal (Zaheer, 1995) and contextual variables 
(Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994). Thus different types of FDI projects vary in their sensitivity 
to institutional distance. In particular, we expect the scale and scope of the local operation and 
of the MNE’s global resources to moderate the impact of institutional distance on entry mode 
decisions. We analyze two such characteristics: the relative size of the affiliate and the 
foreign parent’s international experience. 
Overseas affiliates vary in their relative importance for the investing MNE. When 
MNEs build greenfield operations that are large relative to their own size, internal resource 
constraints may inhibit the establishment of the new affiliate. For example, assuming that 
there is a maximum rate at which the firm can recruit and train managers, firms seeking to 
expand rapidly may be constrained by internal shortages of human capital (Penrose, 1959). 
Similarly, a large greenfield affiliate may be more difficult to finance because capital markets 
have difficulties in accessing and verifying information, which the firm may posses, on the 
merits of the project. In contrast, outside investors can more easily assess acquisitions based 
on the track record of the acquired organization (Chatterjee 1990). Therefore, the additional 
resources that MNE’s aiming to establish large affiliates, relative to their size, requires can be 
accessed more easily by acquiring a local firm or by establishing a JV. Several empirical 
studies find that larger affiliates are less likely in form of greenfield projects (Caves and 
Mehra, 1986; Kogut and Singh 1988; Hennart and Park 1993; Padmanabhan and Cho 1995; 
Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). This leads us to: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: MNEs establishing a large affiliate (relative to their own size) are less likely 
to enter by greenfield investment than by acquisition or joint venture. 
 
A relatively large subsidiary commands more attention from top management than a 
smaller operation because it has a stronger impact on corporate performance. Moreover, the 
transfer of practices becomes relatively more important and more difficult because the parent 
has relatively fewer resources and experiences. Large acquisitions therefore take on more of 
the character of mergers, in that both organizations have to adjust to each other, rather than a 
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small acquired unit having to adapt to the established practices of the new parent. Such a 
process requires more intensive interaction between individuals, and thus cross-cultural 
communication (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Similarly, when setting up a JV agreement 
the MNE exposes itself to problems regarding intercultural negotiations that are likely to 
result in a decreased performance of the affiliate (Brett and Okumura, 1998). Cross-cultural 
communication is more likely to fail, the higher the normative and cognitive distance between 
the organizations. This is because differences in scripts, schemas, norms or values impede 
information sharing between individuals from different cultures and might inhibit their ability 
to search for better alternatives. Hence, in a distant market, obstacles to establishing and 
managing a large acquisition or joint venture rise disproportionately and firms wishing to 
establish a large operation would be more likely to choose entry by greenfield then they 
would be in nearby locations. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: MNEs establishing a large affiliate (relative to their own size) are less likely 
to enter by greenfield investment, yet this effect is weaker in countries with high normative 
and cognitive distances. 
 
Institutional distance and experience in emerging economies 
We have argued that entry mode choice implies a trade-off between the challenges of 
transfer of practices and of gaining local legitimacy. Both challenges increase, the less 
familiar is a foreign investor with the local environment. However, familiarity can also be 
developed through commercial experience in the country (Johansen and Vahlne, 1977; Davis, 
Desai, and Francis, 2000). Through a process of acculturation (Berry, 1980), MNEs develop 
familiarity with local environment in which they operate. This is generally assumed to reduce 
the effects of distance (Shenkar, 2001). MNEs can draw their knowledge of foreign markets 
from a broad range of contexts in which they operate. Their internal processes thus reflect a 
variety of different institutional frameworks, which facilitates cross-cultural transfer of 
practices, and reduces associated costs. MNEs with experience in similar environments may 
even have developed practices specifically to serve such contexts. Moreover, having gone 
through the process of local adaptation and attaining legitimacy in similar emerging 
economies, they can be expected to build capabilities that facilitate this process (Henisz, 
2003). 
Regional experience may be more important for MNEs’ in emerging economies than 
the more general concepts of international experience used in the analysis of international 
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business strategies in developed countries (Delios and Henisz, 2003, Henisz, 2003, 
Uhlenbruck, 2004). In emerging economies, problems of law enforcement can be ubiquitous, 
bringing into question the ability of new entrants to enforce contracts. Moreover, compared 
with their counterparts from industrialized nations, local firms in developing countries may 
have a smaller resource endowment (Hitt et al. 2000), in particular fewer marketing 
capabilities (Fahy et al., 2000), and less experience in forming and managing strategic 
alliances (Lewin, Long and Carroll, 1999). Skills and practices developed through prior 
experience in developed countries are also often inappropriate or impossible to apply in an 
emerging markets context (Tallman, 1992). The MNE may instead develop specific business 
concepts and methods to serve the needs and abilities of customers in an emerging market, 
and subsequently transfer them to other similar emerging economies (Prahalad, 2004). 
Local experience in emerging markets is however less crucial when operating in 
similar environments, such that we would expect a direct effect of experience on mode choice 
only when analyzing FDI between distant countries. Hence, experience diminishes the impact 
of distance predicted in hypotheses H1a to H1c, such that the interaction effects should have 
the opposite effect than the direct effects:  
 
Hypothesis 3a: MNEs that have little experience in emerging economies are more likely to 
choose greenfield investment than acquisition or joint venture when the regulatory distance 
between the home and the host countries is large. 
Hypothesis 3b: MNEs that have little experience in emerging economies are less likely to 
choose greenfield investment than acquisition or joint venture when the normative distance 
between the home and the host countries is large. 
Hypothesis 3c: MNEs that have little experience in emerging economies are less likely to 
choose greenfield investment than acquisition or joint venture when the cognitive distance 
between the home and the host countries is large. 
 
INDICES OF INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE  
Empirical studies on the impact of distance on entry mode choice have mostly 
employed the Kogut-Singh index3 and generated inconclusive results (Shenkar, 2001; 
Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001). For example, Kogut and Singh (1988) find a negative 
correlation between control over the affiliates and cultural distance while Pan (1996) reports 
                                                 
3 An indication of the popularity of the measure is frequency of citations to Kogut and Singh (1988). According 
to the SSCI database, the paper was cited 260 times from 1988 to 2003, 28 times in 2003. 
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the opposite. This inconsistency is, in our view, due to the imprecision of the measures used. 
In this section, we refine institutional measures that are relevant for the entry mode choice, 
complementing the Kogut-Singh index with indicators of regulatory and cognitive distance. 
The normative pillar of a country’s institutional profiles consists of values and norms. 
Values define what is preferred or desirable, while norms specify how things should be done 
and therefore delineate what a society perceives as accepted behavior. The issues are captured 
by Hofstede’s indices of culture, and thus by Kogut-Singh index. Three out of the four 
cultural dimensions defined by Hofstede (1980) capture aspects of expected social behavior: 
Power Distance describes the expected behavior toward higher and lower rank people, 
Individualism/Collectivism depicts peoples attitude toward the group, and 
Masculinity/Femininity captures the status of values traditionally associated with male and 
female role models. In addition, the normative dimension encompasses beliefs and 
assumptions about the human nature, which are reflected in an individual’s attitude and quest 
for truth. More precisely, on the religious or philosophical level, individuals from some 
societies believe in an ultimate truth and adhere to strict laws and rules that lead them to it. 
Unusual situations make them feel uncomfortable and so they rather avoid them. However, in 
other societies people are relativist, have as few rules as possible, and feel at much more ease 
in unstructured situations. These aspects are captured by the fourth dimension of Hofstede’s 
culture construct – Uncertainty Avoidance. 4  
An extensive literature establishes the relevance of distance in Hofstede’s cultural 
construct for the entry mode decision (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Barkema and Vermeulen, 
1998; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001 among many others). Therefore we use as a proxy for the 
normative distance an index based on Hofstede’s cultural construct that we compute in the 
following way: 
∑ −=
i
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where Ii,host (Ii,origin) is the ith dimension of the index for the host country (country of origin) 
and Vi is the variance of the ith dimension. 
The regulatory dimension of distance concerns laws and other rules that influence 
business strategies and operations. According to Scott (1995/2001), the regulatory pillar of 
institutions consists of rules and regulations and the extent to which these rules are monitored 
                                                 
4 In more recent work, Hofstede introduced a fifth dimension ‘Confucian dynamism’ to capture the specific 
features of Asian societies, but these data are not available for the same large set of countries; and scholars using 
Kogut-Singh indices do not normally incorporate it. 
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and enforced. Thus, Scott's definition incorporates all possible aspects of regulation. In order 
to implement this comprehensive notion empirically, we employ an index that covers as 
broad a range of regulatory aspects as possible, the ‘Regulatory Factor’ of the Economic 
Freedom Index published by The Heritage Foundation. This index includes six sub-indices 
(Beach and Miles 2003):  
 
• Licensing requirements to operate a business 
• Ease of obtaining a business license 
• Corruption within the bureaucracy 
• Labor regulations, such as established workweeks, paid vacations, and parental leave, 
as well as selected labor regulations 
• Environmental, consumer safety, and worker health regulations 
• Regulations that impose a burden on business  
 
We use data for the year 2000, and compute the regulatory distance as the absolute 
value of the difference between the regulatory measures of the home and host country (for 
detailed definitions and sources of the variables, see Appendix 1). 
The cognitive pillar comprises frames, routines and scripts used by individuals in one 
society to judge and to assign meaning to a phenomenon and to solve problems. The existing 
cognitive frames held by employees in organizations determine what information is retained 
and how it is processed, organized and interpreted. They also shape the preset routines 
developed by organizations to provide guidance and reduce the discretion of the individuals 
when attempting to solve problems. The future operation and performance of foreign 
affiliates are affected by the way that managers and other employees process new information 
and the relevance of developed and adopted routines. These aspects are difficult to measure, 
especially by readily available data. However, individuals with higher education are more 
likely to spot and adequately process essential information and are more receptive to 
innovation (Becker, 1970; Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971; Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981; 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). In addition, in comparison with individuals who are mainly 
interested in their own community, individuals oriented towards a society beyond their own 
community are also more committed to attain professional goals and therefore more likely to 
adopt innovations in their workplace (Merton, 1957). Therefore, more highly educated or 
more cosmopolitan employees are more inclined to contribute to valuable routines developed 
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in the organization. Moreover, people that are more exposed to new information and 
technology have a broader scope to add to the sphere of organizational knowledge and 
routines. We thus measure cognitive distance by combining two items of educational 
achievements and two items of exposure to new technologies that also indicate the society’s 
level of cosmopolitanism. The education measures are the percentage of economically active 
population with tertiary education, and the average schooling years in the total population. 
We measure technology exposure and cosmopolitanism by the number of computers and 
Internet hosts per 1000 persons. The data derive from a variety of sources. We consulted the 
ILO Yearbook of Labor Statistics, OECD Statistics, and country Statistical Offices to collect 
information on the percentage of the economically active population that has attained tertiary 
education. The average schooling years in the total population comes from Barro and Lee’s 
(2000) dataset on educational attainment. For the number of computers and Internet hosts per 
1000 persons we used the World Development Indicators. Whenever possible, we used data 
for the year 2000. Otherwise, we used data for the closest preceding year for which the data 
was available. Crombach’s alpha analysis showed a 0.60 inter-item correlation. Finally, to 
compute the cognitive distance we use the same formula as above. 
The measures are both based on readily available data for almost all developing and 
developed economies. In addition, with the exception of Hofstedes’s (1980) cultural 
dimension, these indices are reported each year, starting at least from 1995, making them 
suitable to be used with recent sets of data. In Table 2, we report the three measures of 
distance for the countries of Table 1, including the four emerging markets of our study. The 
three measures give a different ranking for the four emerging markets. Interestingly, South 
Africa has the lowest average for all three measures of distance but the highest is for Vietnam 
for regulatory distance and for Egypt with respect to both cognitive and normative distance. 
*** Table 2 approximately here *** 
 
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Data 
Our study is based on an interesting new data set from a recent FDI survey in the four 
emerging economies (Estrin and Meyer, 2004). The base population for the survey study was 
all registered foreign direct investment projects established between 1990 and 2000, with a 
minimum employment of 10 persons, and minimum foreign equity stake of 10%. The time 
limit was designed to ensure that information concerning the establishment was part of the 
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organization memory and therefore available at the time of the survey. The base population 
has been constructed on the basis of local databases. In India and Vietnam, comprehensive 
databases were obtained from the authorities licensing or registering FDI. In Egypt and South 
Africa, we used commercial databases that were complemented with the research institutes’ 
own databases.  
The questionnaire was administered to foreign investment companies in the four 
countries between November 2001 and April 2002 by local research institutions. They sent 
the questionnaire to a stratified random sample drawn from the base population. In most 
cases, they followed up by sending specifically trained assistants to interview the CEO or an 
appropriate senior manager, though some questionnaires were received by mail. Response 
rates from between 10% of the population in Egypt to 31% in South Africa. The sample was 
stratified by two digit industrial sectors to ensure that the sectoral distribution of firms closely 
resembled the distribution for the population.  Within each sector, firms were chosen 
randomly.  
This study is based on the manufacturing subset of the sample, because different 
factors can influence entry mode for service sector firms (Brouthers and Brouthers 2003), and 
because some of the measures of distance, e.g., regulatory, are found to be of particular 
relevance to industrial firms. The sub-sample contained 245 foreign affiliates, but our 
researchers encountered some resistance in responses to commercially sensitive material. 
Hence, as is common in emerging markets, we lost some observations due to missing values 
and we obtained 208 useable observations for the regression analysis. This is quite a large 
sample for research of this sort in emerging economies. The missing values affect in 
particular small parent firms for whom information on parent-specific data is less available.5 
This seems unlikely to bias the estimates, albeit we shall be careful to make inferences about 
small parent firms. 
The regional patterns show clear geographic proximity-effects in Egypt and Vietnam, 
and strong European presence in South Africa and India. In Egypt and Vietnam, investors 
from other emerging markets with low institutional distance play an important role, notably 
Arab investors in Egypt and Chinese investors (especially from Taiwan) in Vietnam. In 
contrast, neither South Africa nor India benefit from regional FDI, as both countries are 
geographically distant from major multinational business centers.  
                                                 
5 T-tests on the main variables of interest (mode, experience, time of entry, R&D intensity, etc) comparing firms 
with and without missing values to test for sample selection biases do not reveal statistically significant 
differences. However, the tests suggest that relatively small parent firms that undertake resource-seeking FDI in 
Vietnam account for a significantly higher share of the observations with missing values.  
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 Empirical model and dependent variable 
We perform the econometric analysis using a Logit model in which the dependent variable is 
mode of entry. This procedure estimates the probability that a foreign investor establishes a 
greenfield investment, given by 
Y
Y
e
egreenfieldentry of modeP
+
==
1
)( , (1) 
where Y is defined as 
Y = β0 + β1 X1 + β2 X2 +  + βn Xn. (2) 
X1, X2,  , Xn are the independent variables. Mode of entry is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if the foreign operation was set up as a greenfield investment and a value of 0 
otherwise. We classified a newly established operation as greenfield investment if it was fully 
owned by foreign parents and did not involve takeover of a local firm. The proportion of 
greenfield projects in the sample is 24% in India, 26% in South Africa, 38% in Egypt and 
66% in Vietnam.  
 
Independent Variables 
The most important independent variables of this research, the measures of institutional 
distance, have been introduced above. The hypothesized interaction effects between 
institutional distance and relative size and experience are tested on the basis of the survey 
data. Relative size is based on a question concerning the turnover of the affiliate relative to the 
parent, using six point Likert scale from “0.0-0.1%” to “over 20%”. Experience is captured 
with a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the foreign investor had prior experience in 
the host economy or any other emerging economy. In line with the literature, we also 
introduce a number of control variables that we expect to influence mode choice, listed 
below.  The measurements of these variables and data sources are described in Appendix 1. 
Market seeking: Foreign investors seeking new markets need to set up local 
distribution networks, which require a continuous interaction with the domestic environment, 
and, especially in developing markets, good connections with local and central governments 
(Rawski, 1994). Local firms are likely to have a good understanding of the local environment, 
established relationships with local businesses and authorities, and an adequate distribution 
network. Thus, we expect entry for market seeking reasons to be negatively related to the 
propensity to establish greenfield investments.  
Source of main resources: An affiliate that receives most of its key resources from its 
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foreign parent is less dependent on local inputs and distribution channels. Moreover, the main 
resources for success may be organizationally embedded, in which case they are more easily 
transferable between companies with similar organizational structures. Consequently, when 
the MNE provides the most important resources itself, it is more likely that the affiliate will 
be established as a greenfield investment.  
R&D intensity: Capabilities based on recent R&D are easier transferred to greenfield 
projects, as MNE’s can create a compatible organizational culture and technological 
infrastructure, and recruit new employees to fit their organization (Hennart and Park, 1993; 
Meyer and Estrin 2001). Therefore we conjecture that the propensity to enter through 
greenfield investment increases with the level of R&D intensity of the parent. 
Related: When a foreign investor sets up a horizontal investment in the same or a 
related industry, it already possesses industry-specific capabilities and is less likely to seek 
such resources from a local partner. Therefore, affiliates producing the same or related 
products as the parent firm are more likely to be set up as a greenfield project (Caves and 
Mehra, 1986; Hennart and Park, 1993). 
Diversified: Diversified foreign investors often rely on managerial control systems 
that accommodate diverse operations. In addition, they are more likely to have been created 
through a series of acquisitions and/or JVs. Therefore, we expect that more diversified firms 
to have more experience with this form of expansion, and thus have a higher propensity to 
acquire or to form a JV. 
Time trends and country dummies: All countries in our dataset have gone through 
liberalization and economic reforms during the period when the sample firms first entered. 
Yet these reforms progressed at different times and different paces. We control for these 
country specific effects by including both country dummies and separate time trends for each 
of the four countries.  
Appendix 2 presents the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics of the dependent 
and independent variables. Apart for the interaction terms, the correlations do not reach 
ranges for which multicollinearity would be a concern. 
 
Results 
Our main purpose is to assess the explanatory power of the indices of institutional distance. 
As reference, we estimate a base model that includes relative size, experience and the control 
variables. The analysis is then conducted in three stages. First, we test hypotheses 1a to 1c by 
adding the three dimensions of the institutional distance to the base model. We estimate three 
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restricted models (Model 1 to 3, Table 3) with one institutional aspect each, and their joint 
effect (Model 4, Table 3). We proceed by constructing four further models by adding to 
Models 1 to 4 the corresponding interaction terms (Model 5 to 8, Table 4). Finally, we use 
Wald tests for linear hypotheses to identify the variables and the interaction terms that 
provide the best fit for the entry mode regression and use the results to construct a more 
parsimonious model (Model 9, Table 4). 
 
*** Table 3 *** 
 
The base model shows that relative size, experience and all control variables have 
signs consistent with our predictions. These variables are highly relevant for MNEs’ entry 
mode choice decision, explaining around 28% of the variation (as approximated by the 
pseudo R2). Thus, the base model is fundamentally sound and largely consistent with prior 
empirical studies on entry modes.  Among the control variables, foreign parent’s degree of 
diversification, market seeking, and the source of main resources are highly significant with 
the expected sign. On the other hand, an expansion into a related business is associated with a 
greenfield investment, but not significantly so. Prior experience in the emerging markets has 
a negative effect on MNEs’ propensity to establish greenfield subsidiaries. For the relative 
size affiliate/parent however, the effect is not significant. We discuss these last two results 
together with the interaction effects below.  
 
Step I 
Models 1 to 3 in Table 3 show the impact of each aspect of institutional distance on 
the entry mode choice. The regulatory distance is highly significant and its sign is as 
predicted in Hypothesis 1a. This confirms our hypothesis that regulatory distance inhibits the 
adoption of corporate practices by a local partner firm, while not substantially affecting the 
ability of an affiliate to earn legitimacy. To facilitate the transfer of practices, MNEs set up 
greenfield investments.  
We predicted an opposite effect with respect to normative and cognitive distance. We 
find strong support for Hypothesis 1c, with increasing cognitive distance lowering the 
propensity for greenfield investment. This implies that with increasing cognitive distance, 
foreign affiliates become more concerned with legitimacy than with adopting practices from 
their parent. Apparently, training of the affiliate’s employees can overcome the negative 
impact of cognitive distance on the transfer of MNEs’ practices, yet it does not enhance its 
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legitimacy with different cognitive institutions. On the other hand, Hypothesis 1b is not 
supported; the impact of normative distance is not significantly different from zero. 
Comparing the individual models with the base model, both models 1 and 3 increase the 
explanatory power significantly – the chi-square statistic increases respectively 6.88 and 9.81 
for one degree of freedom. However, for model 2 the increase is very small and statistically 
not significant. 
When all three dimensions of institutional distance are included in the equation 
simultaneously in model 4, the chi-square statistic increases by more then 10 (and 2 degrees 
of freedom) compared to any of the previous models, which is highly significant. One might 
wonder whether the variation in entry mode choice can be fully captured by only one or two 
of institutional distance measures. Tests on the individual coefficients show that all three 
measures of institutional distance should be retain in the analysis; Wald tests that two (all 
possible combinations) or three institutional distances simultaneously have null coefficients 
are all rejected at 5% significance level. The increase in the chi-square and pseudo R2 
statistics in Model 4 also suggests that all three institutional distance measures should be 
retained in the equation. Thus, we conclude that regulatory, normative and cognitive distances 
between the home and the host countries are all essential to explain foreign investors’ entry 
mode choice, and should be used simultaneously.  
 
*** Table 4 *** 
 
Step II 
In Table 4, we report regressions that combine the direct effects of distance on entry mode 
with the hypothesized interaction effects.6 Since our preferred model includes the three 
distance variables, we would like to use this to explore the impact of particular interaction 
effects. Unfortunately, though this equation (Model 8) is highly significant, many of the 
individual coefficients are not which may be caused by multicollinearity between interaction 
terms and the corresponding direct effects, on one side, and the multicollinearity among 
interaction terms on the other. Therefore, we assess the impact of interaction terms on the 
entry mode choice based on models with only one aspect of institutional distance and its 
                                                 
6 Since we are primarily interested to know the impact of institutional distances on the entry mode strategies for 
MNEs with no prior experience in emerging markets and vice-versa, the impact of experience on these strategies 
when when countries have similar institutions, we did not center the interaction terms. Moreover, centering does 
not reduce multicollinearity in our sample because of the characteristics of our data: most of the parent firms had 
had some experience in emerging markets when establishing the affiliates and experience is a dummy variable. 
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interaction terms (Models 5 to 7). As before, we start by analyzing the aspects of distance and 
their interaction effects individually in Models 5 to 7. Comparing Models 5 to 7 with their 
counterparts, Models 1 to 3, the chi-square is higher by respectively 5.38, 9.42 and 0.57, of 
which the first two are significant. Thus, we confirm the statistical relevance of interaction 
effects for regulatory and normative, but not for cognitive distance. 
 The results from Models 5 to 7 moreover show that the coefficient on the interaction 
effect between experience and distance are in all cases opposite to the direct effect, as 
predicted in hypotheses 3a to 3c. For regulatory and normative distance, the direct effect is 
positive and the interaction effect is negative, while the reverse holds for cognitive distance.  
This result suggests that the significant effect of prior commercial experience in 
emerging economies on foreign investors’ propensity to establish greenfield operations only 
applies for investors entering distant countries.7 When controlling for the interaction with 
distance, the direct effect of experience remains small and insignificant in models 5 and 6. 
Thus, when distance is low, say for British investors in South Africa or Taiwanese in 
Vietnam, experience does not influence entry mode choice. In model 7, the direct effect of 
experience remains significant, which may indicate that the cognitive distance measure alone 
captures only part of the relevant institutional distance.  
For cognitive distance, we observe the same effect, but it remains insignificant in 
Model 7. The direct effects on cognitive distance and experience are larger then in Model 3, 
but subject to higher variance (lower Wald statistics), suggesting multicollinearity. The lack 
of significance of the interaction effect may be because investors can overcome differences in 
cognitive institutions by providing training to affiliate employees. This would lower the 
constraints on the adoption of parent’s practice.  
The size of an FDI project relative to its parent MNE’s size is found in Table 3 to be 
negatively associated with the propensity for greenfield investment but the coefficients are 
insignificant when no interaction effects are considered. However distance might still 
moderate the impact of relative size on the entry mode choice. This is confirmed for 
normative distance, but not for regulatory or cognitive distance (Table 4). In Model 7, the 
joint impact of relative size and institutional distance is highly significant, and the direct 
                                                 
7 The negative direct effect of experience may be explained by the fact that MNE’s with prior experience in 
emerging markets may have developed routines that are adapted to the particular context, which helps them to 
overcome the restructuring challenges facing acquisitions and the coordination problems with local partners 
(Hitt et al. 2000). MNE’s without such experience would find it more costly and time-consuming to find a 
partner, and to build a relationship – let alone engage in post-acquisition restructuring. Meanwhile, they are 
more likely to identify local partners with converging objectives. For these reasons, in Central and East 
European countries, local firms acquired by MNEs with prior experience in the region exhibit higher growth 
rates (Uhlenbruck, 2004).  
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effect of relative size also becomes significant. It would seem that the effect of relative size 
varies under different conditions, which leads to insignificant coefficients when not 
controlling for the interaction with distance. Thus, Hypotheses 2a and 2b are supported with 
respect to normative distance.  
To further illuminate the impact of relative size, we analyze the marginal effects. First 
we insert in equation (2) the actual values of coefficients (Model 7, Table 4) and then take the 
first derivative of equation (1) with respect to relative size, holding all other explanatory 
variables constant: 
dNormative_ 
 sizeRelative
Y 259.0732.0 +−=
∂
∂ . (3) 
Thus, ceteris paribus, the overall impact of the relative size on the propensity to establish a 
greenfield investment is negative when the normative distance between FDI’s home and host 
country is small but turns positive for high values of this distance (Normative_d > 2.825).8 To 
understand these relations, for “low” and “high” values of relative size and normative 
distance, we compute the probability that an investment is set up as greenfield (equation (1)) 
keeping all other effects constant at their mean value. We define as “low” and “high” values 
that are, respectively, one standard deviation above and below the mean (Aiken and West, 
1991; Erramilli and Rao, 1993). The resulting graphs are presented in Figure 2 and illustrate 
the direction of change in probabilities as the relative size increases.9
 
*** Figure 2 *** 
 
When the normative distance between the host and the home country is small, the impact of 
relative size on the entry mode choice is as predicted in Hypothesis 2a, and a high relative 
size is associated with acquisition or JV. However, when the normative distance is large, 
institutional constraints become more important than the Penrose constraint, and so foreign 
investors are likely to choose greenfield investments, even when the relative size of the 
project with respect to the MNE is high.  
 
Step III 
The multicollinearity problems present in Model 8 led us to construct a more 
                                                 
8 Note that this value is above the average of normative distance for all host countries as reported in Table 2.  
9 Note that the lines in this graph unite discrete points and do not represent the actual relationships between 
relative size and the probability to set up a greenfield investment; however, their slopes correctly show the 
direction of change (Erramilli and Rao, 1993). 
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parsimonious regression by dropping insignificant variables on the basis of Wald tests. 
Interactive variables were dropped singly in inverse order to their significance until only 
significant terms remained. As a result of this procedure, all the interaction terms that were 
not significant in Models 5 to 7 need to be excluded, as is the interaction between the 
institutional distances and the parent firms’ experience. The final model, Model 9 in Table 4, 
includes just two interaction terms and explains an additional 3.1% of the variation in 
MNE’s’ entry strategies compared to Model 1.  
Models 8 and 9 allow us to reassess hypotheses 2a and 3a. An increase in the 
relative size of the foreign operation with respect to its parent reduces the probability that the 
operation is a greenfield project, which supports hypothesis 2a. In the models of Table 3, this 
effect was disguised by the missing interaction between the normative distance and relative 
size. In Model 4, the negative effect of an increase in relative size is partly offset by the 
positive effect of the associated increase in the interaction term caused by the correlation 
between relative size and this interaction term. A reverse situation happens with the MNEs’ 
prior experience in emerging markets. Model 4 suggests that an increase in experience tilts 
MNE’s’ preference towards acquisitions or JV agreements. As we expected, once experience 
is interacted with institutional aspects in Models 8 and 9, this direct effect becomes 
insignificant. Thus, prior experience in emerging markets matters only if the institutional 
distance between home and host contexts is high. 
These results support our conjecture that distance in all three dimensions is 
important to explain the entry mode choice. Moreover, their interaction with firm 
characteristics is also important and the interpretation is complex. Failure to account for the 
interaction can lead to misjudgments on the impact of other variables on entry mode choice. 
  
DISCUSSION 
The concept of institutional distance helps to explain how differences between countries 
affect international business decisions. We have argued that this concept is broader than the 
measures of cultural distance used in prior research; and that cognitive and regulatory aspects 
of distance may have quite different effects on international business strategies. Our results 
confirm the opposite effects of different aspects of distance on entry mode choice, and the 
interaction of distance with firm and project specific variables.  
More specifically, we show that while an increase in the regulatory distance results in 
a higher propensity to set up a greenfield investment, the opposite is true for high differences 
in cognitive aspects. Achieving internal consistency is impeded in highly distant normative, 
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regulatory or cognitive institutional contexts. By setting up greenfield investments, MNEs 
can ease the transfer of strategic organizational practices. Meanwhile, legitimacy of the 
foreign operations is more difficult to attain when the normative and cognitive distances are 
high, but this may be overcome by entering with a local partner. The relative importance of 
external legitimacy and internal consistency often depends on contextual variables 
Moreover, we hypothesized that the probability of a greenfield investment is 
positively related to regulatory distance, but negatively related to normative and cognitive 
distance. Our empirical analysis confirms that regulatory and cognitive distance have 
opposite effects but the impact of normative distance is insignificant unless interaction effects 
are taken into account.  
We find that the relative size of the foreign affiliate and the MNE’s’ level of 
international experience act to moderate the impact of institutional distance. As larger 
affiliates command more attention from their foreign parent, MNEs that aim to establish large 
foreign operations are more inclined to avoid the managerial challenges of intercultural JVs 
or acquisitions by setting up greenfield investments. Cross-cultural communication problems 
arise in particular with normative distance, which thus deters JV or acquisition entry if the 
project is large. With respect to international experience, theoretical considerations suggest 
that experience and low distance both increase the familiarity of the foreign investor with the 
local context. In distant countries, experience can compensate for the obstacles of distance 
and facilitate the otherwise difficult transfer of practices and attaining legitimacy. We found 
that an MNE’s’ level of international experience does indeed moderate the impact of 
regulatory and normative institutional distance on entry mode choice. Moreover, we find that 
experience influences mode choice only if institutional distance is high.  
Our analysis supports the view that business strategies have some distinctive 
characteristics in emerging markets (Wright et al., 2005). For example, the process of 
expansion into foreign markets normally follows the pattern of starting with a low capital 
commitment, which can later be increased once the MNE has gained sufficient international 
experience. The traditional internationalization process thus describes a gradual increase of 
involvement through changing level of commitments from contractual arrangement to joint 
ventures, and finally to wholly-owned affiliates (Johansen and Vahlne, 1977). However, in an 
emerging market, the financial and managerial challenges of engaging in a joint venture may 
be considerable, given the organizational legacy from the venture partner and the often weak 
technology. Thus, we find MNE’s may prefer to build a small local operation first, and on the 
basis of this local operation search for a suitable local partner for a larger project. Therefore, 
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while in developed markets international experience has a positive effect on the propensity to 
set up a greenfield investment, our results show the opposite effect for emerging economies.   
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this paper, we propose new indicators of the institutional environment that taken together 
provide a richer proxy for institutional distance than has been employed in the literature 
hitherto. We have argued that this approach has particular relevance for emerging markets, 
where the concept of institutional distance is particularly complex and multi-faceted, and a 
less coarse set of measures may greatly improve our understanding of business strategies in 
these environments. We have also sought to ensure that the indices that we propose are easily 
computable and are based on publicly accessible data because the availability of suitable data 
is a major constraint on research about emerging markets.    
Our approach has some weaknesses however. Our measures may not capture certain 
aspects of normative and cognitive distance, e.g. the entrepreneurship orientation of 
individuals, managerial abilities, or the appreciation of work quality. Moreover, our use of 
culture as a proxy of the normative dimension of distance is open to criticism because culture 
is a carrier, not a component, of the institutional environment (Scott, 2001/1995). Further 
research may wish to develop an alternative construct for the normative environment. 
 A more general concern is the assumption of corporate and spatial homogeneity in the 
use of indices such as ours (Shenkar 2001). The use of indices reflecting the host or home 
economy, or the distance between them, assumes that the average of the respective country is 
an appropriate measure of the environment of the specific FDI project. However host 
economies may vary internally, while MNE’s are exposed to different environments and 
develop their own unique corporate culture. Hence, unsurprisingly, we find that distance 
affects primarily firms with little international experience. Thus, indices of the environment 
must always be approximations rather than precise measures.  
 Our analysis of entry mode choice also has limitations. Chang and Rosenzweig (2001) 
have shown that the entry mode choice for first and subsequent entries into a foreign country 
might be influenced by different factors. We control for this effect with our experience 
variable. However, further research may clarify how the impact of institutional distance on 
entry mode choice and its interaction with MNE and project characteristics varies for 
subsequent entries. Given the multidimensionality of institutions, such research could show 
which institutional aspects are more challenging to overcome for foreign investors. 
In our empirical analysis we have studied the relation between entry mode choice and 
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the institutional distance using a dataset that consists from FDI in manufacturing industry. 
However, scholars have shown that because of their peculiarities (e.g. low capital intensity), 
service firms’ might choose their entry modes based on different criteria than manufacturing 
firms (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003). In further research scholars might want to investigate 
the relevance of the institutional distance for the entry mode choice in services.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Previous research has shown that similarities between the home and host countries may 
influence entry mode choice, using the concept of psychic distance, mostly measured by 
Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions of culture. In this study, we show that, in addition to normative 
aspects of culture, cognitive and regulatory dimensions indicate distance between countries 
that are highly relevant for international business strategies. Different institutional aspects 
impact the entry mode decision in different ways and therefore, in order to capture the range 
of pressures that distance exerts on MNE’s, researchers should consider all these aspects 
together. In addition, institutional distance may interact with firm and project characteristics 
in determining the entry strategy.  
Our empirical study of entry mode in four very different emerging markets confirms 
that different aspects of institutional distance impact on the mode of entry in different and 
often contradictory ways. Moreover, the interactions with firm and project specific 
characteristics are significant and complex. The estimated equations reveal that firm and 
project specific characteristics influence the choice of entry mode differently depending on 
whether institutional distance is large or small. This suggests that particular characteristics 
may have a different influence on choices for investments between developed countries, and 
between developed and developing countries. For example, between developed market 
economies where institutional distance is small, international experience has a positive effect 
on the propensity to enter through a greenfield investment. However, between developed 
economies and emerging markets, where institutional distance is large, the opposite effect 
holds; international experience increases the probability of entry through Joint venture or 
acquisition. The fact that scholars have ignored these interactions might explain the 
conflicting results obtained in previous research regarding the impact of country differences 
on the entry decision (Shenkar, 2001). 
 
 28
Figure 1: Managing across Institutional Distance 
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Table 1: Source countries of FDI accounting for 90% of inward FDI stock. 
Country Main foreign investors 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
United States (34.44%), France (16.65%), Netherlands (14.14%), Germany (8.89%), Japan 
(3.59%), Australia (3.36%), Canada (3.17%), Switzerland (3.09%), Belgium / Luxembourg 
(1.38%), and Sweden (1.34%). TOTAL 90.05%. 
CANADA United States (62.38%), France (9.37%), United Kingdom (7.54%), Netherlands (5.02%), Japan 
(2.64%), Germany (2.35%), and Switzerland (1.91%). TOTAL 91.21%. 
VIETNAM Singapore (15.05%), Taiwan (12.49%), Hong Kong (9.29%), Japan (8.80%), South Korea 
(8.25%), France (5.56%), British Virgin Islands (4.72%), United Kingdom (4.54%), Russia 
(4.03%), United States (3.43%), Australia (2.99%), Malaysia (2.89%), Thailand (2.79%), Panama 
(1.72%), Switzerland (1.60%), Netherlands (1.50%), and India (1.39%). TOTAL 91.06%. 
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
United Kingdom (77.85%), Germany (5.37%), United States (5.37%), and Switzerland (2.68%). 
TOTAL 91.28%. 
INDIA United States (25.41%), Mauritius (15.15%), United Kingdom (10.23%), Japan (5.05%), 
Korea(South) (4.34%), Germany (4.08%), Netherlands (3.96%), Australia (2.98%), France 
(2.89%), Malaysia (2.68%), Singapore (2.36%), Italy (2.11%), Belgium (2.01%), Israel (1.87%), 
Cayman Island (1.71%), Switzerland (1.38%), Canada (1.27%), and Thailand (1.09%). TOTAL 
90.55%. 
EGYPT United States (54.36%), United Kingdom (33.21%), Germany (4.94%). TOTAL 92.51%. 
Sources: OECD database; The Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam (2000); The Ministry of Industry, India; South 
African Reserve Bank; Central Bank of Egypt. 
 
Table 2: Distance from main foreign investors that account for 90% of the FDI stock. 
  Normative distance Regulatory distance Cognitive distance  
Egypt min 0.63 0.85 1.18 
 max 0.87 1.48 2.35 
 weighted avg 0.82 1.22 2.29 
India min 0.38 1.18 0.21 
 max 0.85 3.53 1.52 
 weighted avg 0.62 1.86 0.96 
South Africa min 0.22 0 0.68 
 max 0.35 1.18 1.32 
 weighted avg 0.34 0.10 0.72 
Vietnam min 0.26 1.18 0.09 
 max 1.11 4.70 1.58 
 weighted avg 0.60 3.40 0.97 
UK min 0.15 0 0.05 
 max 0.93 1.18 0.70 
 weighted avg 0.45 0.64 0.40 
Canada min 0.20 0 0.31 
 max 0.90 1.18 0.78 
 weighted avg 0.28 0.24 0.41 
Definitions and Sources: See Appendix 1. 
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Table 3: Entry Mode Choice – Institutions 
Logistic Regression Results (Greenfield = 1) 
Base Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Variables 
B Wald B Wald B Wald B Wald B Wald
Regulatory_d   0.765** 6.49     0.809** 6.57
Normative_d     0.140 0.52   0.350 2.41
Cognitive_d       -0.406*** 8.91 -0.519*** 11.27
Relative size -0.131 1.4 -0.126 1.23 -0.122 1.19 -0.183 2.56 -0.170 2.02
Experience -2.355*** 11.91 -2.547*** 13.2 -2.404*** 12.2 -2.465*** 11.91 -2.891*** 13.94
Market seeking -0.010** 4.33 -0.010* 3.75 -0.011** 4.57 -0.011** 4.75 -0.012** 5.23
Source of main resource 0.010** 5.28 0.010** 4.88 0.010** 5.39 0.010** 4.54 0.010** 4.84
R&D intensity 0.173* 2.87 0.197* 3.6 0.165 2.58 0.240** 4.8 0.271** 5.73
Related 0.477 0.71 0.531 0.84 0.443 0.6 0.347 0.36 0.302 0.24
Diversification -1.282** 4.86 -1.616*** 6.96 -1.308** 4.98 -1.568*** 6.82 -2.083*** 10.07
Constant 2.405 2.48 1.208 0.54 2.199 1.93 4.178** 6.36 3.059* 2.87
N 208  208  208  208  208  
Chi-square (df) 77.56(14)  84.44(15)  78.08(15)  87.37(15)  97.52(17)  
Pseudo R2 0.280  0.304  0.281  0.314  0.351  
Increase in Chi-square 
(df), relative to 
benchmark model 
--  6.88 (1)*** over base 
0.52 (1) 
over base 
9.81 (1)*** 
over base 
10.15 (2)*** 
over model 3 
Notes: * =10%, ** =5%, *** =1%. 
All regression included country dummies and time trends for each country. The initial regression also 
included industry dummies, but since none of them was significant and since our sample is small we 
decided to drop them. 
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Table 4: Entry Mode Choice – Institutions and Interaction Effects 
Logistic Regression Results (Greenfield = 1) 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Variables 
B Wald B Wald B Wald B Wald B Wald
Regulatory_d 2.831** 4.55     1.388 1.24 0.882*** 7.08 
Regulatory_d*relative size 0.024 0.04     -0.012 0.01   
Regulatory_d*experience -2.311* 3.5     -0.560 0.26   
Normative_d   0.480 0.41   1.211 0.88 0.693 0.81 
Normative_d*relative size   0.259** 4.92   0.230* 2.88 0.255** 4.32 
Normative_d*experience   -1.244* 3.13   -1.721 2.05 -1.262* 3.21 
Cognitive_d     -0.720 2.4 -1.164 1.49 -0.515*** 10.06
Cognitive_d*relative size     0.038 0.33 0.012 0.02   
Cognitive_d*experience     0.229 0.3 0.657 0.53   
Relative size -0.157 0.48 -0.732** 6.08 -0.317 1.44 -0.721* 3.42 -0.765** 5.96 
Experience -0.261 0.03 -0.332 0.06 -3.287* 3.79 -1.388 0.34 -0.776 0.27 
Market seeking -0.010* 3.68 -0.009* 3.24 -0.011** 4.18 -0.010* 3.64 -0.010* 3.64 
Source of main resource 0.011** 5.65 0.011** 5.8 0.010** 4.83 0.012** 5.75 0.011** 5.36 
R&D intensity 0.206* 3.75 0.149 1.99 0.242** 4.82 0.262** 4.97 0.254** 4.72 
Related 0.359 0.37 0.320 0.3 0.350 0.36 0.125 0.04 0.141 0.05 
Diversification -1.715*** 7.12 -1.592** 6.15 -1.552*** 6.64 -2.440*** 10.22 -2.481*** 11.3 
Constant -0.675 0.09 2.231 1.05 5.327** 5.22 3.542 1.32 3.090 1.76 
N 208  208  208  208  208  
Chi-square (df) 89.82(17)  87.51(17)  87.94(17)   107.52(23) 106.26 (19) 
Pseudo R2 0.323  0.315  0.316  0.387  0.382  
Increase in Chi-square (df), 
relative to benchmark 
model 
5.38 (2)* 
over model 1 
9.42 (2)*** 
over model 2 
0.57 (2) 
over model 3 
10.00 (6) 
over model 4 
8.74 (2)*** 
over model 4 
Notes: * =10%, ** =5%, *** =1%. 
The regression included country dummies and time trends for each country. The initial regression also 
included industry dummies, but since none of them was significant and since our sample is small we 
decided to drop them.  
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Appendix 1: Variables  Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Regulatory_d Absolute distance on the level of regulations and 
restrictions to operate a business 
Regulation Factor from 
the Index of Economic 
Freedom (2000) 
Normative_d Distance on four cultural dimensions defined by 
Hofstede (1980): power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance.i
Hofstede (2001) 
Cognitive_d Distance on four cognitive dimensions: i
1. Percentage of economically active population that 
has attained at least tertiary education. Year: 2000; 
Age: 25+ 
 
ILO Yearbook of Labor 
Statistics 2001 and 2002, 
OECD Statistics, country 
Statistical Offices 
 
2. Average schooling years in the total population. 
Year: 2000; Age: 25+ 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
 
 
3. Number of computers per 1000 persons World Development 
Indicators (WDI), 2000 
 4. Number of internet hosts per 1000 persons WDI (2000) 
Relative size 
affiliate / parent 
Takes into account the relative turnover in the affiliate 
and in the parent company for the year 2001 and was 
assessed based on a Likert-type scale from one (0.0-
0.1%) to six (over 20%). 
FDI Survey 
Experience Prior experience in emerging markets. Dummy: = 1 if 
the investor had prior commercial experience in the 
host country, its region or other emerging markets; = 
0 otherwise 
FDI Survey 
Market seeking Percentage of output sold in the domestic market 
during the first year of business operation. 
FDI Survey 
Source of main 
resource 
Percentage of the main resource that was obtained 
from the foreign parent firm during the first two years 
of operation (We asked respondents to select the most 
important type of resources for their affiliate’s 
competitiveness. In a second question we then asked 
to estimate what percentage of this resource would be 
contributed by respectively the foreign partner, the 
local partner, or other sources.) 
FDI Survey 
R&D intensity Worldwide expenditure of the foreign parent firm on 
R&D as a percentage of its global sales 
FDI Survey 
Related Diversification parent/affiliate. Dummy = 1 if one of 
affiliate’s products is also produced by its foreign 
parent; = 0 otherwise. 
FDI Survey 
Diversification Parent’s degree of diversification. Dummy = 1 if the 
parent is a conglomerate diversified into unrelated 
business sectors; = 0 otherwise. 
FDI Survey 
Time trends for 
each country 
Year of legal establishment in a specific country – 
1989 (= 0 if the host country is one of the remaining 
three countries) 
FDI Survey 
Country dummies Four country dummies FDI survey 
i Distance is computed as ∑ −=
i
V
II
i
originihostiD
2
,, )( , where Ii,host (Ii,origin) is the ith dimension of the 
standardized index for the host country (country of origin). We used standardized values for each 
dimension since scales are not the same across dimensions. 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 e n D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 5 6 Variabl Mea S 1 1
1     Greenfield *** *** 1
2      Normative_d 2.38 0.99 0.09 1
3      Normative_d*Relative size 7.21 5.06 0.18 0.47 1
4     Normative_d*Experience 2.20 1.16 -0.06 0.82 0.33 1
5     Regulatory_d 1.62 0.96 0.34 0.27 0.28 0.20 1
6      Regulatory_d*Relative size 5.36 5.18 0.31 0.05 0.64 -0.02 0.72 1
7     Regulatory_d*Experience 1.47 1.02 0.16 0.28 0.21 0.47 0.84 0.54 1
8    Cognitive_d 3.88 1.58 -0.07 0.35 0.12 0.30 0.19 0.08 0.21 1
9     Cognitive_d*Relative size 12.04 8.62 0.08 0.04 0.69 -0.02 0.24 0.66 0.16 0.48 1
10 Cognitive_d*Experience 3.56 1.88 -0.17 0.33 0.06 0.58 0.16 0.00 0.42 0.80 0.29 1  
11 Experience 0.91 0.29 -0.23 0.13 -0.06 0.60 0.00 -0.11 0.46 0.07 -0.11 0.60 1  
12 Market seeking 70.99 41.17 -0.28 -0.03 -0.28 -0.02 -0.37 -0.45 -0.29 -0.16 -0.36 -0.11 0.02 1  
13 Source of main resource 59.07 42.75 0.24 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.21 0.13 0.22 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.08 1  
14 Relative size 3.16 1.84 0.11 -0.17 0.72 -0.22 0.14 0.70 0.04 -0.08 0.77 -0.17 -0.19 -0.27 0.00 1  
15 Related 0.86 0.35 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 0.04 0.11 1  
16 R&D intensity 3.48 2.01 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.12 -0.10 -0.07 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.02 0.16 0.00 0.01 1 
17 Diversification 0.15 0.36 -0.20 -0.05 -0.15 -0.05 0.09 -0.07 0.11 -0.16 -0.21 -0.12 0.04 0.08 -0.04 -0.15 -0.17 -0.05 
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